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1487 
Article 
Judicial Nominations in an Umpireless 
Game: Trusted Sources, a Complaint, and 
a Proposal 
Benjamin Wittes† 
Put yourself for a moment in the shoes of a political jour-
nalist the day the President announces a new Supreme Court 
nominee. In all likelihood, you have never heard of the nominee 
before today. Or if you have, the nominee is just a name to you; 
you have no familiarity with the career behind the name. With-
in minutes, maybe even seconds, of the President’s announce-
ment of his choice, however, people who are familiar with the 
career in question are flooding your email inbox with docu-
ments—some of them substantial in length—that grandly pro-
nounce themselves “reports” on the nominee. These reports 
present utterly divergent views of a long career composed of 
judicial opinions, client representations, speeches, and articles 
on subjects of enormous technical and legal complexity. One set 
of reports promises that confirmation of the President’s choice 
will push the country once and for all into the abyss; the other 
set promises just as confidently that the nominee is the second 
coming of John Marshall. Except the calls you can make in a 
few hours and the information the White House releases, these 
reports represent your only significant sources of information. 
And you are on a deadline. 
A version of this reporting crisis shows up, as well, in an 
increasing number of lower-court confirmation battles, though 
it plays out in slower motion. Although in theory, the press has 
ample time to gather information about nominees between the 
President’s announcement of his choice and the moment at 
which controversy erupts, newspapers and press organizations 
 
†  Benjamin Wittes is a Senior Fellow and Research Director in Public 
Law at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of CONFIRMATION WARS: 
PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES (2006). Copyright © 2009 
by Benjamin Wittes. 
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in general have scaled back their coverage of the lower federal 
courts. So the reporter will generally neglect the nomination 
until it becomes controversial. At that point, the reporter—
often a congressional correspondent, rather than a legal affairs 
or a courts reporter—parachutes in to cover the controversy for 
a few days until the next crisis takes center stage. This report-
er has done little or no background research on the nominee 
and has extremely limited time to do so now. The interest 
groups, by contrast, have had a lot of time—they, after all, have 
generated the controversy in question and are generally the on-
ly people who have followed it closely. And they just happen to 
have written these thick-looking reports filled with case cita-
tions and quotations. The reporter, who probably does not know 
much about law, has neither personal insight nor trusted 
source to whom to turn for an explanation of the dispute. 
As a long-time journalist, I would love to describe the 
press’s reaction to this problem in heroic terms, as a kind of 
triumph of deadline reporting by sophisticated generalist intel-
lectuals over dense subject matter spun by ideologues into edi-
ble sound-bites that these reporters nonetheless show the dis-
cipline to resist. I cannot do it. The simple truth is that most 
reporters, most of the time, act exactly as one would predict 
based on the incentive structure of the situation: they let the 
interest groups set the terms of the discussion. 
Many factors contribute to the rise of interest group power 
in the confirmation process. In this Article, however, I will dis-
cuss only one: the absence of a trusted source of information 
about the nominees and the controversies surrounding them. 
The press, more often than not, is badly positioned—
institutionally—to play the role of truth cop in this arena. And 
in the absence of some external truth cop, the press instead 
tends merely to report on disputed questions, rather than to try 
to resolve them. One side says that a nominee is “outside the 
mainstream” or a “liberal activist” and the other side denies the 
allegation. The press reports both sides and often leaves it at 
that. 
Right now, nobody else is doing much better. The American 
Bar Association’s (ABA) Standing Committee on the Federal 
Judiciary assesses nominees’ qualifications and confronts alle-
gations of misconduct. But it is not well positioned to take on 
suggestions of ideological extremity; indeed, it explicitly 
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eschews this task.1 Yet a candidate’s professional qualifications 
seldom form the basis for opposition to a nomination, in part 
because the ABA rating typically puts that issue to rest. Few 
groups that comment on nominees apply remotely similar 
standards to those of Republican and Democratic presidents, 
nor do they take the same view of procedural hurdles imposed 
on nominees by the senators of one party as they do when the 
senators come from the other party. This hypocrisy is entirely 
bipartisan. With certain individuals honorably excepted,2 both 
sides lack any semblance of intellectual credibility. Meanwhile, 
the judiciary itself maintains a studied silence on nominations, 
but for an occasional reference in the Chief Justice’s year-end 
reports. Though many judges are heartsick on the subject, the 
judiciary routinely comments on legislative proposals that im-
pact its functioning far less than does the confirmation 
process.3 The result is that in an area of ever-increasing politi-
cal contention, no umpire is calling balls and strikes—leaving 
 
 1. The ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary “evaluates the 
professional qualifications of all nominees to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, circuit courts of appeals, district courts (including territorial district 
courts) and the Court of International Trade.” American Bar Association, 
Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2009). The Committee states that its goal “is to support 
and encourage the selection of the best-qualified persons for the federal judi-
ciary,” and thus the Committee “restricts its evaluation to issues bearing on 
professional qualifications and does not consider a nominee’s philosophy or 
ideology.” Id. Further, the Committee structures its peer-review process “to 
achieve impartial evaluations of the integrity, professional competence and 
judicial temperament of nominees for the federal judiciary.” Id. 
 2. Senator Arlen Specter, for example, showed approximately the defe-
rence to President Clinton’s nominees which he demanded of his colleagues for 
President Bush’s. 
 3. In 2007 and 2008, for example, the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts issued press releases on such subjects as the use of cameras in the 
courtrooms, fund appropriations, federal sentencing policies’ effect on public 
confidence in federal courts, and mandatory minimum sentencing laws result-
ing in decades-long sentences for first-time offenders. Press Release, Admin. 
Office of the U.S. Courts, Judiciary Makes Case for Fiscal Year 2009 Funding 
(Mar. 12, 2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/2008/appropriations 
.cfm; Press Release, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Corrosive Effect of Fed-
eral Cocaine Sentencing Laws Cited (Feb. 12, 2008), http://www.uscourts 
.gov/Press_Releases/disparity080208.html; Press Release, Admin. Office of the 
U.S. Courts, Judicial Conference Opposes Use of Cameras in Federal Trial 
Courts (Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/ 
cameras092707.html; Press Release, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Manda-
tory Minimum Terms Result in Harsh Sentencing (June 26, 2007), http://www 
.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/sentencing062607.html. 
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the players free to design their own strike zones and move 
them about whenever convenient. 
My purpose in this Article is both to describe the conse-
quences of our umpireless confirmation game and to suggest 
the establishment of an institutional umpire for it. That is, I 
mean to propose the deliberate construction of an intellectual 
counterweight to the ideological interest groups that now do-
minate the confirmation process, the creation of a trusted 
source of information about judicial confirmations. This source 
would present both rigorously non-ideological commentary on 
nomination battles and empirical data concerning individual 
nominees, the aggregate treatment of nominees in general by 
the Senate, and presidential expeditiousness at filling vacant 
judgeships. The idea is to give the public at large and that 
journalist facing the reporting crisis outlined above somewhere 
else to turn. 
I do not wish to overstate the likely short-term impact of 
such a project. Many of the fundamental problems driving the 
confirmation process to ever-greater partisan polarization are 
structural in nature and will not be ameliorated by the creation 
of an authoritative, non-ideological voice in the debate. For 
years to come, judicial nominations will remain a field of active 
political contest, and as a consequence, unfairness, hypocrisy, 
and attack politics will necessarily attend it. Because, in judi-
cial confirmations, congressional politics ultimately comes 
down to a vote on a human being—rather than on an issue or 
on a proposal—it will inevitably carry an ugly sort of personal 
tinge as well. I do not pretend that an umpire will change this. 
My claim, rather, is more modest—that an umpire will dis-
cipline the debate, creating a measure of accountability for 
statements about nominees that are currently presented as ipse 
dixits. The idea is to make it a little harder to lie about nomi-
nees or to radically distort their records by having at least one 
institution that routinely applies the same standards to nomi-
nees of both parties, that permits realistic comparisons of sena-
torial treatment of nominees over time, and that carefully dis-
aggregates issues that our political debate now routinely 
mashes together. By creating and cultivating such an institu-
tional voice, which I mean to build at the Brookings Institution, 
I believe we might begin improving a debate that is now largely 
out of control. 
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I.  THE PROBLEM   
I have watched the problem of the umpireless judicial nom-
inations game up close for many years. In fact, between 1997 
and 2006, I was probably the closest thing to an umpire the 
game had. As the Washington Post’s editorial writer on legal af-
fairs, I was in a unique position vis-à-vis judicial confirmations. 
Washington politics is the Post’s bread and butter, so as the de-
bates over lower-court nominations heated up during the Clin-
ton and Bush administrations, the Post devoted a great deal 
more attention to the subject than did most newspapers. More-
over, the Post does not have an ideological editorial page, as 
does the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal; my col-
leagues and I tried very hard to apply the same standards to 
both administrations and to neither blindly support nor reflex-
ively oppose any nominee. The result was that neither Republi-
cans nor Democrats took our support for granted, and we had 
the ear of, and unusually strong access to, both sides. We rou-
tinely talked to the administration about its nominees, both 
under Presidents Clinton and Bush. We talked to Senate staf-
fers of both parties about controversial nominees. We also rou-
tinely talked to the nominees themselves, many of whom were 
willing to meet with us, or at least to keep a channel open. And 
we also talked to sitting judges about their potential colleagues. 
This access was one of several respects in which I was 
probably less vulnerable to the influence of interest groups 
than are most journalists. Perhaps more important still, I was 
something of a specialist: I wrote about law and almost nothing 
else. And as a result, I was able to write about nominations to 
courts in the broader context of writing about the institutional 
work product of those same courts. For example, when Presi-
dent Bush nominated Brett Kavanaugh to the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals, I knew Kavanaugh’s career rather well, hav-
ing written about his work both at the White House and pre-
viously at the Office of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr.4 I 
also knew the tangled history of nominations to the court in 
question, which had not merely seen senators fighting about 
individual nominees but also taking strong stands about 
whether to fill certain judgeships at all—and then switching 
those positions when administrations changed. And, finally, I 
knew the court itself—its culture and the sort of work that it 
 
 4. Kavanaugh, for example, is quoted several times by name in my book 
on the Starr investigation. BENJAMIN WITTES, STARR: A REASSESSMENT 77, 
89, 91, 131, 132 (2002). 
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does and does not do. All of this played a big role when it came 
time for me to write an editorial on Kavanaugh’s confirmation. 
I was in an unusually good position to form a view of my own. 
Most reporters do not get that opportunity, and in many 
cases I did not either. Although I was well positioned relative to 
almost all other journalists, I was not invulnerable to the inter-
est groups’ malign influence all of the time. For example, dur-
ing the Clinton administration a conservative group attacked a 
Ninth Circuit nominee, Marsha Berzon, and painted her as an 
abortion-rights radical. I mentioned this basis for opposition to 
the nominee in an editorial supporting her5—only to find out 
later to my horror that she had, in fact, no public record on 
abortion at all. On many occasions I could have used guidance 
from an authoritative source that had no bias either for or 
against the nominee in question but which had looked at the 
issue I was writing about carefully and according to known and 
consistent standards. 
The interest groups can be astonishingly aggressive about 
filling this void. In the case of one Bush administration nomi-
nee, for example, a representative of a liberal interest group 
opposing the nominee handed me two reports. One was a public 
document; the other was a “for your eyes only” confidential 
document in a sealed envelope. I never opened the envelope, so 
I cannot be sure what it contained. But I presume it contained 
attacks of a nature more personal or tendentious than the 
group was willing to engage in publicly. 
Part of the problem in the debate over judicial nominations 
is that political actors in our system contest virtually every sig-
nificant component of the issue6—and most major players in 
the debate do not have stable positions on the key questions. Is 
the President entitled to deference from the Senate over a no-
minee and, if so, how much deference? Is a nominee’s ideology 
legitimate grounds for senatorial opposition and, if so, when? 
For that matter, what exactly does ideology mean? Americans 
who follow judicial matters argue over the qualifications of in-
dividual nominees, both in absolute terms and relative to one 
another. They argue over ethical questions. They even argue at 
 
 5. Editorial, The Paez and Berzon Votes, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2000, at 
A28 (“Ms. Berzon stands accused of favoring abortion rights and supporting 
the labor movement.”). 
 6. The one major component of federal judicial nominations that Ameri-
can political society still does not seriously contest is district court nomi-
nations; they rarely provoke major controversy. 
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length over what should be purely empirical questions: which 
President’s nominees have fared better and worse in the Se-
nate? Which party has run the confirmation process more or 
less fairly and expeditiously? I suspect that one of the reasons 
the debate is so far-flung and undisciplined is the lack of any 
authoritative voices within it. 
Trusted sources matter, and other politically contested 
fields to one degree or another have them. Economists across 
the political spectrum, for example, rely on data and reporting 
from a variety of government agencies.7 Many of these data 
categories—the size of the federal deficit, the unemployment 
rate, the inflation rate, consumer confidence, and durable goods 
orders, to cite a few examples—are accepted as probative of 
something important in economic discussion. Trusted sources 
offer a great range of material and are not limited to data re-
porting. Their reach extends to analytical work by governmen-
tal sources—the State Department’s annual human rights re-
ports and investigative reporting by inspectors general, for 
example—as well as similar work product by non-governmental 
institutions. While the most obvious of these trusted sources is 
the press itself, researchers in any number of organizations, 
universities, or think tanks, and even bloggers, can play the 
same role. The key is consistent, useful information and analy-
sis delivered in a fashion that disciplines to some degree the 
combatants in political disputes by adding to the discussion a 
rigor that neither side can ignore. 
No such institution has developed organically with respect 
to judicial nominations. The only two that even attempt such a 
role are the ABA and the press, and both are badly positioned 
for the task. The ABA process, even when it works properly—
and it generates a great deal of controversy on its own terms—
addresses a series of questions few people are really asking. To 
some degree, this is a function of the ABA’s success; a “well 
qualified” ABA rating generally makes it unproductive to argue 
against a nominee’s qualifications, and the prospect of the rat-
ings process probably discourages the selection of candidates 
who do not meet minimal professional standards. As a result, it 
is quite rare that the stated objections to a particular nominee 
concern his or her professional qualifications, and when they 
 
 7. See The U.S. Department of Labor Home Page, http://www.dol.gov 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2009) (summarizing a series of common economic metrics 
such as the Consumer Price Index and Unemployment Rate, at the bottom of 
the page in the “Latest Numbers” section). 
 1494 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1487 
 
do, those professional qualifications seldom constitute the real 
reason for opposition. They are usually a convenient cover for 
opposition on some other basis. When we debate whether John 
Roberts or Samuel Alito is too conservative for the Supreme 
Court or whether a particular nominee’s ethical infractions are 
disqualifying, the ABA’s description of the candidate as “well 
qualified” is singularly non-responsive to the issue at hand. 
Even when many Democrats debated whether Judge Kava-
naugh was “qualified” for the D.C. Circuit, the debate had a 
false ring. It was an all-but-open pretext for something else: the 
fear of another young conservative who had cut his teeth, to a 
liberal eye, in all the wrong places. Except in truly unusual cir-
cumstances, presidents do not nominate people who are frankly 
unqualified for the federal bench, and when they do, the politi-
cal system does not need the ABA to point out the deficiency.8 
The press is a more plausible umpire, for the same reason 
that it successfully serves that role in other arenas. And at its 
best, it already plays this role in judicial nominations. For ex-
ample, when NARAL Pro-Choice America took out a flam-
boyantly false advertisement about Roberts’s advocacy in abor-
tion cases,9 press attention quickly forced it to pull the ad.10 
That said, I am pessimistic that that the press will take on this 
role in a systematic fashion with respect to judicial confirma-
tions. The reason, to put it bluntly, is diminishing interest. The 
press just does not care that much about law. Very few report-
ers go into the business because of a passion for the law; they 
become reporters, by and large, with ambitions to cover politics 
or to investigate wrongdoing in high office. And the allocation 
of resources within journalistic institutions reflects this bias. 
Consider the Washington Post, which, as I have said, does 
as good a job as any media organization in this area. It has a 
full-time editorial writer assigned to legal affairs. It has a Su-
preme Court reporter. It has a federal courts reporter who 
largely covers trials in federal court in Washington. It has part-
 
 8. See JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE 
STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT 271–84 (2007) (discussing how conservatives’ objections to Harriet 
Miers’s qualifications to serve on the Supreme Court did not await the ABA’s 
judgment). Indeed, conservatives precluded her nomination’s going forward 
even before the ABA had rendered any judgment. Id. 
 9. Linda Greenhouse, TV Ad Attacking Court Nominee Provokes Furor, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2005, at A1. 
 10. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Abortion Rights Group Plans to Pull Ad on Ro-
berts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2005, at A14. 
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time coverage of Maryland federal courts. And it has a reporter 
covering trials in Northern Virginia—the site of many of the 
major terrorism cases. And that is it. None of these people—
except the editorial writer—handles nominations to the courts 
they cover. Compare that for a moment to the legion of report-
ers the Post assigns to covering a campaign or the administra-
tion and Congress or the local football team. The result is al-
most inevitably that lower-court nominations will go under-
covered and that Supreme Court confirmations will be covered 
ad hoc by people with no particular expertise or tactile familiar-
ity with what the Court does. And importantly, both will be 
covered as political stories rather than as events in the life of 
the federal judiciary. 
Further, the press—even if it were willing to engage more 
seriously with confirmation politics—is badly positioned as an 
institution to engage the substantive debates over nominees. 
The press can report that Senator Ted Kennedy alleges that a 
given judge is “outside the mainstream” or that Senator Jon 
Kyl alleges that a different nominee is a would-be “judicial ac-
tivist.” And it can also report that senators on the other side of 
the aisle argue the contrary. The press can report effectively on 
the mechanics of the fight (which senators are holding up 
which nominee?) and it can handle quite well the political fight 
over these procedural fights (is the nuclear option going to be 
exercised?). But it is singularly lousy at answering the question 
of whether the substantive allegations underlying the whole 
eruption are correct. 
The reason is two-fold: first, because of the press’s general 
and honorable posture of evenhandedness between warring po-
litical sides, and second, because of the previously mentioned 
lack of expertise in the substantive law and legal philosophy 
the parties are contesting. Reporters do not know whether the 
nominee of the day is an extremist; they would not tell you if 
they did have a view; and in many cases, that view would not 
be terribly well informed. Without an overt lapse into subjectiv-
ity—a course the press understandably and correctly resists—it 
is difficult to do more than report whether other people agree 
with Kennedy’s or Kyl’s allegations. With notable individual 
exceptions, the press is the institution most in need of an um-
pire; it is not going to serve that function itself. 
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II.  THE CONSEQUENCES   
The absence of a serious umpire has a number of perverse 
consequences. The most important is that all nomination fights 
blur together into an indistinct mélange. American political 
elites have the same argument over nominees that present ge-
nuinely different issues. 
As an example, take three Bush administration nomi-
nations to the D.C. Circuit—those of Judge Kavanaugh, Judge 
Janice Rogers Brown, and the failed nomination of appellate 
lawyer Miguel Estrada. To the average combatant in the wars 
over the courts—and the war over the D.C. Circuit is a particu-
larly fierce theater of conflict within the larger fight—these 
nominations were all of a piece. If you are a liberal, all three 
nominees were right-wing nominations to the second-highest 
court in the land, part of a long-term conservative effort to take 
over the federal courts and position young and minority wing-
nuts for ultimate elevation to the high court. If you are a con-
servative, all three were examples of unfair liberal attacks on 
high-quality conservative nominees whose confirmations 
should have been no-brainers. I would argue, however, that the 
issues raised by these three nominations differed enormously 
and warranted sober, real-time disaggregation from one anoth-
er. 
Ironically—considering his eventual defeat—Estrada pre-
sented the simplest case: an assertion of extreme conservatism 
in the absence of any evidence of it. Estrada had no history of 
taking public positions either on legal questions (except in 
client representations) or on public policy matters. Yet Demo-
crats took his lack of a paper trail of writings and his refusal to 
address certain questions in his confirmation hearing as evi-
dence of their premise, rather than as a lack thereof. The gov-
ernment’s refusal to accede to Democrats’ astonishing demand 
for Estrada’s memos as a staff lawyer in the Solicitor General’s 
office was presumed to be an effort to hide his extremism as 
well.11 In Estrada’s case, there simply was no legitimate issue: 
by all accounts, he was well qualified, and no evidence sug-
gested that he harbored views other than the conventionally 
conservative ones he professed. On a court whose politics 
ranges from Judge David Tatel to Judge David Sentelle, there 
was no non-arbitrary basis on which to reject Estrada. 
 
 11. See WITTES, supra note †, at 32. 
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By contrast, the Democrats had a case to make against 
Judge Brown. Unlike Estrada, she had a record of eccentric 
views, having given speeches in which she seemed to embrace 
the Supreme Court’s long-abandoned Lochner-era doctrines.12 
Additionally, there was at least some reason to believe that 
these views were not simply academic musings, for she had also 
written opinions as a California Supreme Court justice that 
seemed closely linked, thematically, to these writings.13 Given 
how decisively the American legal culture has turned from the 
Lochner-era solicitude for precluding regulation based on subs-
tantive due process, there is clearly a mainstream view on this 
subject—about which conventional judicial conservatism and 
conventional judicial liberalism agree, but against which Judge 
Brown had positioned herself in dissent. 
That fact poses, in my view, a legitimate and non-trivial 
question for senators: how tolerant should they be in the con-
firmation process of qualified nominees who take substantive 
positions which are both eccentric and yielding of outcomes to 
which the senators expect to object? While Judge Brown’s per-
formance on the bench so far has by no means borne out Demo-
cratic anxieties, this is not a question on which all reasonable 
senators will agree. In other words, whereas the record could 
not reasonably support a “no” vote on Estrada, it could on 
Judge Brown. 
Judge Kavanaugh presented the most complicated case, in 
part because everyone knew that Republican senators certainly 
would have opposed the mirror-image Democratic nominee. He 
had a glittery resume, but it was also an overtly political 
resume. He was young (though not the youngest appointee to 
 
 12. See Janice Rogers Brown, Assoc. Justice, Cal. Sup. Ct., Speech at the 
Federalist Society, University of Chicago Law School: “A Whiter Shade of 
Pale”: Sense and Nonsense—The Pursuit of Perfection in Law and Politics 
(Apr. 20, 2000), available at http://www.constitution.org/col/jrb/00420_jrb_ 
fedsoc.htm (“[U]ntil last term the Supreme Court held out the promising pos-
sibility of a revival of what might be called Lochnerism-lite . . . . [which] of-
fered a principled but pragmatic means-end standard of scrutiny under the 
takings clause.”). 
 13. See Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 968 P.2d 993, 1040 (Cal. 
1999) (Brown, J., dissenting) (“[I]n the aftermath of Lochner, . . . the federal 
high court . . . relegat[ed] economic rights to a decidedly inferior status. This 
has resulted in a judicial review not merely deferential but actually nonexis-
tent. The rational basis test—a standard of review which allows legislative ac-
tion to stand if the court can hypothesize any perfunctory justification for it—
is as bad in its own way as substantive due process. Neither approach finds 
support in the constitutional text.”). 
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the court in modern history);14 he was a White House lawyer 
(and Republicans had opposed Elena Kagan’s confirmation, in 
part, on the basis that she had served in Bill Clinton’s White 
House counsel’s office);15 and he had been nominated to the 
long-controversial twelfth seat on the court (which Republicans 
had argued during the Clinton administration against filling, 
citing the court’s scanty workload).16 Judge Kavanaugh, in oth-
er words, was a politically provocative choice, one whom the 
President could not have sent to the Senate without expecting 
to ruffle feathers. At the same time, he had never advocated 
judicial doctrines other than those of a traditional jurispruden-
tial conservative, so no ideological case against him existed. 
And there was every reason to imagine him as a wholly capable 
jurist. 
These three nominees should have presented very different 
issues to the Senate and to the political culture at large. But 
you would lose all that difference in either the New York Times 
or Wall Street Journal editorials about the three cases. Both 
newspapers utterly conflated the three cases according to their 
own preexisting political viewpoints. The Times, for example, 
described Estrada as an “unacceptable nominee” with a “scant 
paper trail but a reputation for taking extreme positions on im-
portant legal questions.”17 Because Estrada “stonewalled when 
he was asked at his confirmation hearings . . . to address con-
cerns about his views” the Times urged the Senate to reject his 
nomination.18 Another Times editorial described Judge Brown 
as “an archconservative justice on the California Supreme 
Court” who had “declared war on the mainstream legal values 
that most Americans hold dear.”19 Yet another editorial de-
scribed Judge Kavanaugh as an “unqualified” nominee who 
 
 14. 152 CONG. REC. S5308 (daily ed. May 26, 2006) (statement of Sen. 
Sessions) (referring to Judges Harry Edwards, Douglas Ginsburg, and Ken-
neth Starr, all of whom were younger than Judge Kavanaugh when they were 
appointed to the D.C. Circuit court).  
 15. News coverage of Kagan’s nomination was almost nonexistent and fo-
cused on her being nominated to a seat which Republicans did not mean to fill. 
That said, objections to confirming a “Clinton White House lawyer” cropped up 
more than once in my reporting on the subject at the time. 
 16. Al Kamen, Hunting for an Unlikely Appeals Judge, WASH. POST, May 
24, 1999, In the Loop, at A23. 
 17. Editorial, An Unacceptable Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2003, at 
A24. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Editorial, Out of the Mainstream, Again, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2003, at 
A18. 
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“does not have the legal background appropriate for such a lofty 
appointment” having, instead, “a résumé that screams political 
partisanship.”20 Kavanaugh’s nomination, the paper said, was a 
sop to the conservative base by a President sinking in the 
polls.21 By contrast, the Journal treated all three as obvious 
calls for confirmation.22 While at the Post, we tried to disaggre-
gate these issues—we supported Estrada vociferously and 
Judge Kavanaugh more cautiously, while opposing Judge 
Brown—we were swimming against a considerable tide. The 
average news consumer could be forgiven for seeing only mi-
nimal distinctions between nominees who warranted very dif-
ferent debates, different both from one another and different 
from what they got. 
Even as the absence of a strong institutional umpire masks 
important differences between nominees and thereby inhibits 
sophisticated debate over those nominees, it also encourages 
debate over things that should not be debatable. Fights over 
whether the Judiciary Committee moved more judges under 
Senator Patrick Leahy’s leadership than under Senator Orrin 
Hatch’s, over whether President Clinton’s nominees fared bet-
ter in the Senate than President Bush’s did, and over which 
nominees received the roughest treatment at the Senate’s 
hands are now a mainstay of the nominations wars. Both sides 
routinely abuse data, using whatever measures are most con-
venient at any given time.23 Yet these are questions with cor-
rect and incorrect answers—matters on which consistency of 
data use is not the hobgoblin of little minds. Data on judicial 
nominations over many decades are available—if sometimes 
difficult to dig out and assess comparatively—and one could 
easily track the Senate’s progress on confirmations across ad-
ministrations and across senatorial control by both parties us-
ing consistent metrics. Yet nobody does so in a manner that in-
forms in real time a pressing political debate. 
 
 20. Editorial, An Unqualified Judicial Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2006, 
at A24. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Op-Ed., Brown Gets Borked, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2003, at A16; 
Op-Ed., The Next Filibuster?, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2006, at A14. 
 23. See, for example, Hatch’s and Leahy’s many dueling statements on 
the subject, in which each claims to have run the committee as a model of effi-
ciency and fairness, while accusing the other of falling far short of the mark. 
154 CONG. REC. S3045 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 2008) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 153 
CONG. REC. S1729 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2008) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
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III.  A VERY MODEST PROPOSAL   
As I noted at the outset, I do not pretend that the creation 
of a trusted source of information about judicial nominees and 
nominations would magically bring about a cease-fire in the 
wars over the courts. The problems afflicting the modern con-
firmation process have their roots in the big, tectonic shifts in 
American politics that have taken place over the past five dec-
ades—the movement of the political parties away from patro-
nage institutions and towards more regional, ideological or-
gans, the rise in judicial power, and the consequently increased 
anxiety over the gateways to a major new power center.24 These 
forces are real and, as long as they persist, Americans will—
and probably should—fight tenaciously over their judges. The 
goal of the project I envision, rather, is to add a measure of ac-
countability to a debate that currently has none and to give the 
public an institution to which it can turn for fair-minded and 
methodologically consistent treatment of a subject that plays 
an ever-growing role in our political discourse. 
What would such a project—which my colleague Russell 
Wheeler and I mean to undertake at the Brookings Institution 
beginning in the new administration—look like in practice? 
First, it would not take a position for or against the confirma-
tion of individual nominees, nor would it take positions on the 
substantive questions of judicial philosophy that underlie a 
large percentage of the controversies surrounding judges. Its 
purpose would, rather, be purely informative and analytical. 
Second, it would actively address, rather than shy away 
from, the areas of actual political dispute concerning any par-
ticular nominee. If she is universally acknowledged to be quali-
fied but alleged to be ideologically menacing, for example, it 
would address the substance of the allegations that are made 
against her, not the professional qualifications to which every-
one accedes. 
Third, it would strive to provide readers with all of the in-
formation they need to know in order to make an informed 
judgment about a given nominee, as well as all of the informa-
tion they need in order to assess the integrity of the confirma-
tion process more generally. 
Bringing these principles down to earth involves the crea-
tion of a dynamic web presence composed of three distinct ele-
ments. The first is a rigorous set of statistical data that tracks 
 
 24. See WITTES, supra note †, at 15–36. 
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both the individual treatment of each nominee and the aggre-
gate treatment of nominees in general: how long did it take for 
the Senate to confirm a given nominee? How long did it take it 
to confirm the average nominee to circuit and district court va-
cancies under a given President or under the leadership of a 
given party in the Senate? What are the confirmation rates of 
circuit and district court nominees under different presidents? 
How has the treatment of nominees changed based on proba-
tive metrics? Does the change correlate with a particular par-
ty’s control either of the Senate or the presidency or is it a non-
partisan effect? These are questions for which a continuous 
flow of constantly updated data would provide a great deal of 
insight. 
The second component is basic biographical information 
about each nominee, as well as a comprehensive set of links to 
news stories, interest group reports, ABA ratings, Senate hear-
ing and debate transcripts, and other public record material. 
Readers should have access through this web site, in short, to 
any significant statement made about, or reporting on, a nomi-
nee. 
The third and most difficult component is an ongoing eval-
uation of controversies that arise over the course of a nomi-
nation. This discussion, which would amount to a kind of blog 
for each nominee, would remain relatively idle in the context of 
non-controversial confirmations but could become quite exten-
sive in Supreme Court nominations or in the harder-fought ap-
peals court—and even district court—nominations. The goal is 
to provide readers with a lens through which to filter the ideo-
logical noise, one that can dismiss trivial controversies and 
provide guidance for thinking about the more serious ones. To 
be effective, it would have to analyze controversies quickly, so 
that the press and the public have somewhere to go that will 
both provide analytically rigorous commentary and do so in a 
fashion responsive to the news cycle. To be credible it would 
have to show consistency in approach over time and the use of 
sound analytical criteria irrespective of party control of either 
the executive or legislative branches. 
  CONCLUSION   
The last several years have seen a variety of different cate-
gories of nomination flaps. They have involved nominees 
against whom the opposition could generate no coherent case. 
They have involved nominees of both parties who were undoub-
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tedly qualified yet about whom the opposite party—given their 
differences with the nominee—would understandably harbor 
anxiety. And they have involved a small number of people 
against whom opponents could muster nontrivial ethical com-
plaints or could argue lacked the minimal qualifications neces-
sary to serve on the bench. Our political system lacks, however, 
an effective mechanism for figuring out and informing the pub-
lic which nominees belong in which box. That failure means 
that every controversial nominee tends to end up in all boxes at 
once; supporters find themselves unable to acknowledge truths 
that might justify no-votes by senators, while opponents feel 
obliged to allege far more than they can prove both about the 
substance of the nominee’s views and about the person’s career 
and ethics. The press and public’s reliance on the interest 
groups as intellectual filters in this debate makes a more rigor-
ous sorting all but impossible. It is time to offer a more serious 
alternative. 
